Abstract
This chapter examines William of Ockham's theory of propositions, and the key role his views play in the development of subsequent medieval debates about propositions and propositional attitudes. Having surveyed both the controversy to which Ockham's views give rise, and the sorts of positions one finds in the subsequent debate, the chapter presents some brief reflections on the relationship between medieval and contemporary debates about propositions. Scholastic views about the nature of meaning and truth are deeply influenced by reflection on certain portions of Aristotle's logical writings, especially the Categories and On Interpretation. In order to appreciate Ockham's account of the objects of propositional attitudes, it will be necessary to present that account vis-a-vis his broader cognitive psychology, in particular, in relation to his views about the connection between judgment and mental language. Demonstrative science is, according to Aristotle's account in the Posterior Analytics, a kind of inferential knowledge arrived at through a demonstrative syllogism.
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