Vietnam’s hedging amid U.S.-China Mekong rivalry: risk management under uncertainties

Abstract

This paper examines how Vietnam has navigated U.S.-China rivalry in the Mekong basin while seeking to ensure its security, prosperity, and autonomy. I use the theoretical lens of hedging, defined as an insurance-maximising behaviour under conditions of high uncertainty. While existing scholarship has extensively examined Vietnam’s hedging on maritime security issues and the broader U.S.-China strategic and economic competition, this paper makes an empirical contribution by focusing on the relatively understudied angle of hedging in the Mekong basin context. I argue that Vietnam has hedged by (1) diversifying its Mekong partnerships with both the United States and China and (2) selectively cooperating with China under the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation. These acts aim to minimise Vietnam’s exposure to the long-term consequences of several non-traditional security risks, namely ecological challenges, water insecurity, economic vulnerabilities, and energy insecurity. Vietnam’s Mekong hedging also insures against the traditional security risks of big-power entrapment and military aggression as U.S.-China competition intensifies.