Vested interests as a hidden driver of Japan’s remilitarization: the case of BMD deployment through a neoclassical realist approach

Abstract

Japan’s shift to balancing through the deployment of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) in 2003 is not solely accounted for by the structural incentives in conventional realism. Rather, it is because of a dynamic interaction of the structure and domestic politics, which is more nuancedly captured by neoclassical realism. This paper posits that the concept of ‘vested interests’ such as economic ones, and not necessarily leaders’ perception of threat, plays a crucial role as a hidden driver of Japan’s remilitarisation regarding BMD. The existing literature does not accurately capture ‘how’ Japan chose the option of BMD as a means of balancing, ‘why’ Japan shifted to balance and ‘when’ it completes the shift and begins balancing. Therefore, by supplementing the existing realist paradigms, the paper intends to establish a theoretical bridge between structure and foreign policy outcome with unit-level variables, the value of which lie in the level of maintenance of theoretical rigour with strong explanatory power. The paper contributes to the substantive debate on why, when and how Japan’s shift occurred to begin balancing from its previous behaviour, with further contributions to a broader theoretical debate on how a major state responds to a rising power.