Verification of limits on long‐range nuclear SLCMs

Abstract

Arms control negotiators have identified a number of problems in verifying limits on long‐range nuclear sea‐launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). These are the difficulties of counting deployed SLCMs, of distinguishing nuclear from non‐nuclear SLCMs, and the possibility of secret production or stockpiles. On‐site inspection measures to monitor either a limit or a ban on nuclear SLCMs could include inspection of: ships and submarines where SLCMs are deployed or being loaded; production facilities; maintenance operations; and storage sites. While verification plans that involved either very few inspections or, at the other extreme, frequent inspections of ships and submarines might be acceptable, a reasonably effective verification plan with an intermediate level of in‐trusiveness is also possible. This would include monitoring of the production and maintenance of any non‐nuclear long‐range SLCMs and any nuclear long‐range SLCMs not banned by the agreement. Tagging of these missiles to allow identification at s...