Vekâlet Kuramına Göre Türkiye’deki Otellerin Pazara Giriş Stratejilerinin Değerlendirilmesi

Abstract

This study evaluates the probability of encountering a moral hazard and risk of adverse selection, which are among agency problems originated from the market entry strategies of enterprises. In this context, we conducted in depth interviews with 46 people who were hotel managers (principal and agent) at five-star hotels operating in Turkey. The data of the study was analyzed in the NVivo 12 Pro package program. We determined three main codes for a “moral hazard” dimension, which were unfair earnings, compliance with the legislation and termination of the contract, and evaluated “risk of adverse selection” dimension via free-riding and trust codes. Our results revealed that according to reports of the participants, there was no difference in the rates of encountering a moral hazard or risk of adverse selection with regard to the market entry strategy. On the other hand, it can be concluded that conducting an audit that hotel management carries out routinely reduces the risk of moral hazard and adverse selection, especially in chain enterprises, both brand and legal audits should be performed. Reports of the participants demonstrated that some hotel enterprises chose to use more than one market entry strategy concurrently. Preventing agency problems as well as economizing may be the purpose of their choices.