Abstract

Germany recently experienced another federal reform, shortly after a previous modification to the German federal system. Has the second federal reform brought substantial change instead of the gradual change that literature on joint decision making would lead us to expect? This article analyses the reform in three stages: agenda setting, negotiation, and ratification; and suggests that at best the new restrictions upon public debt brought about by the second federal reform can be seen as a substantial change, but only if actors comply with them. Furthermore, this note argues that varieties of joint decision making can be identified in German constitutional policy, as they can in German public policy and EU policies. Patterns of joint decision making vary, depending on agenda setting and negotiations, so that the article argues for a differentiated view of joint decision making, the joint decision trap and exits from the joint decision trap.

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