Avoiding the ‘joint‐decision trap’: Lessons from intergovernmental relations in Scandinavia

Abstract

Abstract. This essay provides a critical assessment of an important contribution to the debate on institutional efficiency and inefficiency in European policy–making: the thesis on the ‘joint–decision trap’. This trap was identified by Fritz W. Scharpf, first in German federalism and later in policy–making in the European Union. The essay argues that joint–decision traps may be a much more prevalent phenomenon than envisaged by Scharpf. However, the essay demonstrates that joint–decision traps are not inherent to joint–decision systems. The basic argument of the essay is that the effects of joint–decision systems on public policy is contingent upon the central government's ability to threaten intergovernmental actors with exit. If this is possible, joint–decision systems turn into an asset. This argument is made on the basis of an analysis of intergovernmental relations in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark and a comparison of the Scandinavian systems with those of France and Germany.