Vandalism-Militancy Relationship: The Influence of Risk Perception and Moral Disengagement

Abstract

Both risk perception and moral disengagement underpin crisis intensification, and influence risk behaviours. This research, examines whether risk perception and moral disengagement mechanisms influence vandalism and militancy (terrorism), and if these mechanisms can provide alternative strategies for managing unconventional mass emergencies and disasters. This paper will also clarify and discuss the relevance of the concepts: moral disengagement, moral evaluation, and social trust. The influence and implications of risk perception and moral disengagement on crisis management on a case study of the vandalism and militant incidents that have occurred Niger Delta region over the last decade are discussed. Specifically, this investigation demonstrates that there are potential gains in crisis management, when crisis dimensions, morality issues, and risk perception are used to help anchor strategic options during crises. The present study found that people are more likely to disengage from moral conducts when the mechanisms of moral evaluation and disengagement are routinely experienced. In doing so, people become skilled at neutralising morally questionable behaviours and activities such as vandalism. The findings also indicate that environmental risks are perceived to be more important than economic or biological risks during crises, and that individuals’ susceptible to moral disengagement are not predestined for delinquency. Therefore, environmental victimisation, moralistic punishment, and moral surveillance are all active factors necessary for risk and crisis leaders to address when trying to manage crises. This paper advances the crisis management literature through the analysis of moral disengagement and its implications for crises. This study also provides evidence that errors in risk perception evaluation can lead to ineffective crisis response, and ineffective strategic practices when managing crisis. The findings also challenge assumptions that vandals and militants are inhumane, and that capturing or alienating them will help prevent or reduce future crisis/disaster. Instead, it is argued that these perceptions and practices are ineffective and unsustainable. The implications and limitations of these findings are also discussed.