Abstract
One of the few points of agreement between most theists and non-theists working on the problem of evil is that the existence of a perfect God is incompatible with the existence of pointless evil. In a series of influential papers, however, Peter van Inwagen has argued that careful attention to the reasoning behind this claim reveals fatal difficulties related to the Sorites Paradox. In this paper, I explain van Inwagen’s appeal to sorites reasoning, distinguish between two different arguments in his work, and argue that they both commit the same so-far-unnoticed mistake.
Highlights
Most of us are bothered by much of the suffering that we see
The kind of reflection van Inwagen has in mind is precisely the kind we considered in the previous section
If the no minimum claim is true, the attempt to eliminate all unjustified evils would place God into the same situation as that of our dedicated and conscientious groundskeeper and of the official in Sentence. This is precisely what R4* would ask of God. (I leave it to the reader to spell out the relevant sorites argument.) van Inwagen’s second argumentative step, is the recognition that the vagueness of the relevant predicate is incompatible with the expectations and demands that follow from R4*: If there is no minimum of evil that would serve God's purposes, one cannot argue that God is unjust or cruel for not “getting by with less evil. (1988, 167)
Summary
Most of us are bothered by much of the suffering that we see. Most of us wouldn’t think twice before intervening if we could. Suggesting that truly careful reflection on our experience and knowledge – as opposed to merely cursory and superficial reflection – reveals a variety of justifying reasons, or possible justifying reasons, for all the evils that we see These accounts are sometimes called theodicies or defenses and, especially together, they pose a serious challenge to R1. If God cares for me in particular (as opposed to caring only for certain collective properties of His creation, such as average individual well-being, the historical development of humanity as a whole, and so on) and has the power and knowledge to prevent my suffering on any particular occasion, it seems to me that He would not allow some evil to befall me unless he had correctly identified, in his omniscience, justifying reasons for doing so. If I am right, what is revealed is that van Inwagen’s challenge, though influential, is no challenge after all
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