Vaccination and Herd Immunity: Individual, Collective, and Institutional Responsibilities

Alberto Giubilini

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-02068-2_2

Abstract

This chapter discusses the relation between collective, individual, and institutional responsibilities with regard to the realization of herd immunity from certain infectious diseases. The argument is put forth that there is a form of collective moral obligation to realize herd immunity, that there is a principle of fairness in the distribution of the burdens of collective obligations, and that such principle entails that each of us has the individual moral responsibility to make their fair contribution to herd immunity through vaccination. These individual moral obligations, in turn, entail a further individual obligation to support policies aimed at realizing herd immunity. The chapter concludes with a suggestion that the individual moral obligations to support such policies generate an institutional responsibility to implement them.

Highlights

This chapter discusses the relation between collective, individual, and institutional responsibilities with regard to the realization of herd immunity from certain infectious diseases
Since I am looking for a philosophical justification for any such ethical obligation, the central parts of this chapter will be rather technical in philosophical terms
When grounding any ethical obligation to be vaccinated or to vaccinate one’s children, and when legitimizing any coercive policy that forces individuals to vaccinate themselves or their children, a first ethical problem may arise from a conflict between individual best interest and individual autonomy

Summary

Establishing Ethical Responsibilities in the Context of Vaccination

This chapter is about the ethical obligations or responsibilities pertaining to vaccination of three different actors. One might appeal to the distinction between positive and negative rights and duties to dismiss this analogy: while randomly firing guns violates a negative duty, failing to be vaccinated or to vaccinate one’s children would only represent a failure to act in order to benefit others and might not give rise to any positive duty or positive right Within this perspective, failing to be vaccinated or to vaccinate one’s child cannot be morally equivalent to actively putting other people’s health and life at risk. The risk that a non-vaccinated individual would make a significant difference to the chances that another individual is harmed is significant only if vaccination rates in one’s community are within a certain specific range, neither too high nor too low In such cases an individual duty of easy rescue applies and morally requires individuals to be vaccinated. What does it mean to have a collective obligation? Who or what, exactly, is the bearer of this obligation, and what does a collective obligation imply for individual obligations? In the remaining of this chapter, I will attempt to answer such questions

Aggregate Collective Responsibility and Herd Immunity

From Individual to Institutional Responsibility

Conclusion