Utilitas y voluptas en el De vero bono de Lorenzo Valla

Abstract

In his dialogue De vero bono, Lorenzo Valla (c. 1407-1457) aims to the thinking on pleasure (voluptas) and convenience (utilitas) as two inseparable aspects of an ethics based on the earthly human concerns. These two concepts are opposed to the honestas propter se, that is, the Stoic ideal of virtue as an end itself that should be pursued regardless of anything. In this paper we explore the interaction between the terms of this opposition considering ancient and medieval sources and how this operates in different passages of the De vero bono. Specifically, we will focus on the ways in which the voluptas-utilitas / honestas opposition is related to that of Agustin of Hippo’s (354-430) between uti / frui. By comparing them we will examine how in his dialogue Valla stages tensions between conceptions of ethics based on one side on earthly concerns and on the other on the Christian dogma.