Abstract
ABSTRACT Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever (C&D) have recently argued that the ideal/non-ideal distinction is ‘useless’ in philosophy of language. This paper responds to C&D’s argument, develops an account of the distinction, and applies it to philosophy of language. Section 1 summarizes C&D’s argument against Charles Mills’s version of the distinction. Section 2 develops an account of the distinction that’s inspired by Mills’s work but that differs from what C&D take Mills’s view to be. Section 3 shows that, pace C&D, this distinction picks out interesting subsets of work in philosophy of language. We say that ideal theories adopt models of the social world that fail to recognize systemic oppression and are therefore systematically inaccurate. Nonideal theories correct these inaccuracies.
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