Using Covert Topological Information for Defense Against Malicious Attacks on DC State Estimation

Abstract

Accurate state estimation is of paramount importance to maintain the power system operating in a secure and efficient state. The recently identified coordinated data injection attacks to meter measurements can bypass the current security system and introduce errors to the state estimates. The conventional wisdom to mitigate such attacks is by securing meter measurements to evade malicious injections. In this paper, we provide a novel alternative to defend against false data injection attacks using covert power network topological information. By keeping the exact reactance of a set of transmission lines from attackers, no false data injection attack can be launched to compromise any set of state variables. We first investigate from the attackers' perspective the necessary condition to perform an injection attack. Based on the arguments, we characterize the optimal protection problem, which protects the state variables with minimum cost, as a well-studied Steiner tree problem in a graph. In addition, we also propose a mixed defending strategy that jointly considers the use of covert topological information and secure meter measurements when either method alone is costly or unable to achieve the protection objective. A mixed-integer linear programming formulation is introduced to obtain the optimal mixed defending strategy. To tackle the NP-hardness of the problem, a tree-pruning-based heuristic is further presented to produce an approximate solution in polynomial time. The advantageous performance of the proposed defending mechanisms is verified in IEEE standard power system test cases.