Abstract
The integration of phasor measurement units (PMUs) and phasor data concentrators (PDCs) in smart grids may be exploited by attackers to initiate new and sophisticated false data injection (FDI) attacks. Existing FDI attack mitigation approaches are generally less effective against sophisticated FDI attacks, such as collusive false data injection (CFDI) attacks launched by compromised PDCs (and PMUs) as we demonstrate in this paper. Thus, we propose a secure and resilience-enhanced scheme (SeCDM) to detect and mitigate such cyber threats in smart grids. Specifically, we design a decentralized homomorphic computation paradigm along with a hierarchical knowledge sharing algorithm to facilitate secure ciphertext calculation of state estimation residuals. Following this, a centralized FDI detector is implemented to detect FDI attacks. Findings from the security analysis demonstrate our approach achieves enhanced conventional FDI and CFDI attack resilience, and findings from our performance evaluations on the standard IEEE 14-, 24-, and 39-bus power systems also show that the communication overheads and computational complexity are reasonably “low”.
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
