Using counterfactual regret minimization to create competitive multiplayer poker agents

Abstract

Games are used to evaluate and advance Multiagent and Artificial Intelligence techniques. Most of these games are deterministic with perfect information (e.g. Chess and Checkers). A deterministic game has no chance element and in a perfect information game, all information is visible to all players. However, many real-world scenarios with competing agents are stochastic (non-deterministic) with imperfect information. For two-player zero-sum perfect recall games, a recent technique called Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) computes strategies that are provably convergent to an e-Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium strategy is useful in two-player games since it maximizes its utility against a worst-case opponent. However, for multiplayer (three or more player) games, we lose all theoretical guarantees for CFR. However, we believe that CFR-generated agents may perform well in multiplayer games. To test this hypothesis, we used this technique to create several 3-player limit Texas Hold'em poker agents and two of them placed first and second in the 3-player event of the 2009 AAAI/IJCAI Computer Poker Competition. We also demonstrate that good strategies can be obtained by grafting sets of two-player subgame strategies to a 3-player base strategy after one of the players is eliminated.