Abstract

The Six Day War was one of the most defining moments in the history of the Modern Middle East. This paper seeks to add to the existing scholarship on the subject by going beyond the structural explanation. It gives special attention to the role of unit-level variables like perception, personality, and political psychology of decision-makers. As one scholar noted, threats are not perceived in a vacuum, and are, instead, products of complex synthesis of subjective appraisal of events by the decision-makers. The focus will be on the beliefs and perceptions of the most impactful actor in this crisis: Egyptian President Nasser. As will be argued, his decision-making was shaped by his experience with foreign imperialism, a general misconception of super power intentions, an incorrect analogy between two crucial crisis situations with Israel: the February 1960 Rotem Crisis, and the build-up to the June War in 1967, and especially his complicated relations with the US leaders.

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