Unrest in the world of Soviet Islam

Abstract

From the time of the Bolshevik Revolution to approximately 1973, Soviet policy towards Islam-both inside the USSR and abroad remained remarkably stable. Contrary to what has been written in the West, there were few differences between the treatment of Islam by Stalin, Khruschev or even Brezhnev in the 1960s, except purely tactical ones. Islam in the USSR was treated as a hostile element that had no place in the socialist world and that was doomed to disappear sooner or later in the face of the scientific forces of dialectical materialism. A 'New Soviet Man' would emerge, with a supra-national consciousness, liberated from all ties with the past. As for Islam beyond Soviet borders, Soviet ideologues approached it with considerable caution as a potential adversary. Between 1968 and 1973, Soviet leaders, perhaps even Yuri Andropov himself (he was then head of the KGB) moved to modify this situation. A new, sophisticated two-pronged policy, which at first appears to be paradoxical, was designed. The first aspect of this policy, which has been discussed extensively elsewhere,' involves using the USSR's own domestic and dependably loyal official Islamic establishment as a propaganda tool and as a channel to penetrate the Muslim world abroad, particularly pro-Western Arab states with little or no relations with the USSR. The mechanics of this initiative involve sending Soviet muftis abroad as effective ambassadors, opening Central Asia widely to foreign Muslims who are invited to participate actively in the great religious conferences organised by the Mufti of Tashkent; and accepting many foreign students and experts from Muslim countries in Central Asian universities and institutes. The aim of this aspect of the Soviet 'Islamic strategy' is to increase Soviet prestige and influence in the