Abstract
Within the scholarly debates in political science and genocide studies, an increasingly prevailing view posits that the most adequate explanation for the occurrence of genocide is the strategic approach. According to this view, the main impetus behind the decision to use violence against civilians is not irrational barbarism but rational choices to realize strategic interests. However, how and under what circumstances genocide becomes a rational choice for aggressors in pursuing their strategic objectives has remained largely unexplored. Through a comparative analysis of the cases of Srebrenica and Khojaly, this study seeks to uncover the strategic, political, and ideological factors that underpin the rationale for genocide. The findings show that the viability of genocide as a low-risk option is underpinned by three interrelated factors. These are the recognition of the limited capacity of the victims to mount armed resistance, resulting in a reduced or negligible risk of counterattack; the awareness of the international community’s reluctance to intervene; and the expectation that demographic transformation through ethnic cleansing and genocide could be preserved as a beneficial post-conflict resource.
Published Version
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