Unintentional Terrorism? An Objection to David Rodin's ‘Terrorism without Intention’

Abstract

David Rodin defines ‘terrorism’ as the ‘deliberate, negligent, or reckless use of force against noncombatants’, although he concedes that his account ‘is at odds with the current common usage of the term’. While most believe that terrorism necessarily involves the intentional killing of noncombatants (NCs), Rodin disagrees. His definition allows that some acts involving the unintentional killing of NCs, those that are reckless or negligent, are acts of terror. And while he offers some support for his unorthodox definition, Rodin develops a more substantive argument that ‘many of the noncombatant casualties caused in the course of military operations (including those of Western nations)’ are morally unjustified, and furthermore, ‘morally culpable to the same degree and for the same reasons that typical acts of terrorism are culpable’. Rodin's argument is based on his core premise that many of the actions involving the foreseeable killing of NCs (call them ‘standard cases’) are reckless or negligent despite their satisfying the doctrine of double effect. He begins his support for this claim by arguing that the doctrine of double effect is false, as it does not provide sufficient moral justification for an action. I will argue that Rodin's objections to the doctrine of double effect are unconvincing and that his argument is unsound primarily because his core premise is false. Furthermore, I will argue that those who kill NCs in the standard cases are not as morally culpable as those who commit traditional acts of terror (those that intentionally target the innocent), even if the former have acted unjustly.