Abstract

ABSTRACTMy focus in this paper is the use of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) in the context of Just War Theory. Different versions of DDE have different degrees of plausibility. Two distinctions are crucial. First, I distinguish between epistemically idealized and non-idealized scenarios. Second, I distinguish between versions of DDE that make a ceteris paribus comparison between intentional and non-intentional outcomes, from versions that either make a comparison that is not ceteris paribus or are non-comparative. After undertaking these classificatory tasks, I defend the following claims: First, in an idealized world, ceteris paribus versions of DDE are plausible. Second, we cannot transfer such plausibility to stronger (non-ceteris paribus) versions of DDE. Finally, in a non-idealized world, DDE is plausible. The argument for this last claim combines the reasons for defending ceteris paribus versions of DDE in idealized circumstances with an argument about how to proceed when we face hard choices under uncertainty.

Highlights

  • The doctrine of the double effect (DDE) remains, after centuries, a matter of controversy

  • My focus in this paper is the use of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) in the context of Just War Theory

  • DDE has been used for different purposes in different discussions, ranging from self-defense to Just War Theory to bioethics

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Summary

Introduction

The doctrine of the double effect (DDE) remains, after centuries, a matter of controversy. We must distinguish versions of DDE that make a ceteris paribus comparison between (roughly speaking) intentional and non-intentional outcomes, from versions that either make a comparison that is not ceteris paribus or are non-comparative. We cannot transfer such plausibility to stronger versions of DDE (non-ceteris paribus and non-comparative versions) (section 3.3). The (admittedly exploratory) argument for this last claim combines the reasons for defending ceteris paribus versions of DDE in idealized circumstances with an argument about how to proceed when we face hard choices under ineradicable uncertainty (section 4)

Basic assumptions and distinctions
DDE in the Ideal World
Five versions of DDE in the Ideal World
In favor of ceteris paribus versions of DDE
Against non-ceteris paribus DDE versions in the Ideal World
From the Ideal to the Real World
Uncertainty and consequentialism
Radical uncertainty among strategies
Intentionality reasons becoming salient
The residual requirement to minimize harm
Conclusion
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