Revising the Doctrine of Double Effect

Abstract

The Doctrine of the Double Effect has recently been revised in novel ways that combine the idea of intending to use or involve a person as a means to our ends with other 'moral operators,' such as rights violations, consent and moral duties. According to Warren Quinn's account of the DDE, involving a person as a means to our ends is presumptively permissible, unless the DDE is activated by a moral operator such as a rights violation. Reversing Quinn, Jeff McMahan has argued that involving a person as a means to our ends is presumptively impermissible unless nullified by moral operators such as consent or a moral duty. By combining moral operators with other important revisions, Quinn and McMahan have come closer to a satisfactory analysis of the DDE than anyone else. Nevertheless, I argue that both accounts are still faced with problems of interpreting the idea of involving' a person as a means to our ends. I also show that the arguments of Quinn and McMahan are important in suggesting how we can justify on other grounds many of the judgments previously attributed to the DDE.