Unilateral Initiatives as a Conflict Resolution Strategy

Abstract

In conflict and bargaining, unilateral initiatives can produce concessions by another and can set the stage for conflict resolution. Whether such tactics are effective depends on the impressions given off. According to the theory tested here, power positions help to shape the impressions created by unilateral initiatives. On this basis, we hypothesize that (1) unilateral initiatives are more effective when parties have equal, as opposed to unequal, power relations; and (2) the size of the initiatives has different effects contingent on the relative power of user and target : Large initiatives are more effective than small ones when the user is high-power and the target is low-power, but small initiatives are more effective when the situation is reversed. We found qualified support for these hypotheses. Unilateral initiatives, as expected, created impressions of the user's trustworthiness and decreased the perceptions of the user's strength. The impression-management aspects of unilateral initiatives are more complicated than initially thought, because unilateral initiatives affected not only the impressions given off by users but also the impressions that the targets wanted to give off in response. Implications for conflict resolution are discussed.