Abstract

The liberation of Tunisia from the Axis military forces in 1943 provided the first concrete opportunity for the USA to apply the Atlantic Charter principle of self-determination. This article shows how the US diplomat Robert D. Murphy as presidential representative and political advisor to General Eisenhower quietly undermined key elements of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's policy towards the French and towards self-determination in North Africa. In contrast, the open dissension of another diplomat, Hooker Doolittle, with Murphy's policy of deference to the French on all matters concerning North Africa, including the brutal repression of the newly ‘liberated’ people of Tunisia, ignited a debate that reached the President himself. War-time imperatives, Murphy's superior bureaucratic tactics, and FDR's own ambivalence ensured that the Allied goal of self-determination remained a secondary consideration in North Africa. The episode throws new light on the development of US policy in North Africa during the Second World War, when decolonisation became a real policy option.

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