Abstract
AbstractWe examine the argument for ontic structural realism that begins from an alleged “metaphysical underdetermination” afflicting contemporary fundamental physics. Current discussions have focussed on challenging this underdetermination claim. Our purpose here is to examine what follows even if the premise concerning underdetermination is conceded. We consider the additional premises needed to arrive at an endorsement of ontic structural realism, and show that each can and should be rejected. Moreover, the ontic structural realist program faces an analogous metaphysical underdetermination issue of its own. We conclude that the argument fails, independently of whether the alleged metaphysical underdetermination is conceded.KeywordsPhysical ObjectQuantum ParticleSpacetime PointOntic Structural Realism Structural RealismEpistemic AccessThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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