Abstract
The ‘underdetermination of metaphysics by the physics’ is the thesis that our best scientific theories do not uniquely determine their ontologies. Nonrelativistic quantum mechanics is famously thought to exemplify this kind of underdetermination: it may be seen as compatible with both an ontology of individual objects and with an ontology of non-individual objects. A possible way out of the dilema thus created consists in adopting some version of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), a view according to which the metaphysically relevant aspect of the theory is its structure, not the nature of the objects dealt with. According to OSR, particular objects may be dispensed with (eliminated or re-conceptualized) in favor of the structure of the theory. In this paper we shall argue that the underdetermination of metaphysics by the physics is a consequence of a too strict naturalism in ontology. As a result, when a mitigated ontological naturalism is taken into account, underdetermination does not appear to have such dark consequences for object-oriented ontologies in quantum mechanics.
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