Abstract

In this paper I address the question 'How is knowledge of logical truths possible'. The sought-after explanation should be (ideally) independent of what the true story about logical truth is. In particular, I try to account for the epistemic warrant that is conferred upon logical beliefs when they are neither inferred from other beliefs nor grounded on empirical evidence or testimony. The need for such an account is motivated by the apparent failure of the notions ofanalyticity on the one hand and intuition on the other in addressing the relevant question. I end up defending an account according to which warranted logical beliefs can be grounded on pure reasoning: they can be inferentially formed on the basis of pieces of suppositional reasoning.

Highlights

  • Resumo: No presente artigo, trato da questão 'Como o conhecimento de verdades lógicas é possível?'

  • In the case of psychologism, the thesis that logical truths are in some sense ‘mental’ apparently makes the epistemologist’s life easier: it is not difficult to see how we can attain logical knowledge because it is not difficult to see that we can have introspective access to our own ways of thinking

  • In the case of platonic realism, the thesis that logical truths are about mind-independent abstracta apparently makes the epistemologist’s life harder: how can we have knowledge about something that we cannot causally interact with? Either way, there seems to be an intimate connection between the epistemological question–– ‘How is knowledge of logical truths possible?’––and the partly semantic/ partly metaphysical question––‘What makes logical truths true?’

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Summary

Introduction

Resumo: No presente artigo, trato da questão 'Como o conhecimento de verdades lógicas é possível?'. There is a way in which both questions can be answered at once: one can be both internally and externally warranted in believing those logical claims by reliably inferring them from other things one already knows to be the case. We have two other questions in front of us: (3) How can one be internally warranted in believing logical claims if not by means of inference from other beliefs?

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