Abstract
In his early paper ‘Truth by Convention’ Quine asked what the thesis that the truths of logic and mathematics are true by convention comes to — what it means. His unsuccessful attempts to give it a plausible sense showed that the theory is deficient in crucial respects and that therefore the appeal to conventions cannot account for our knowledge in logic and mathematics. He concluded with the remark: We may wonder what one adds to the bare statement that the truths of logic and mathematics are a priori, or to the still barer behavioristic statement that they are firmly accepted, when he characterizes them as true by convention in such a sense. (W of P, p. 99)1 Much of Quine’s subsequent philosophical effort has been to show that conventionalism adds nothing whatever to that barer behavioristic statement.
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