Uncertainty in a spatial evacuation model

Abstract

Pedestrian movements in crowd motion can be perceived in terms of agents who basically exhibit patient or impatient behavior. We model crowd motion subject to exit congestion under uncertainty conditions in a continuous space and compare the proposed model via simulations with the classical social force model. During a typical emergency evacuation scenario, agents might not be able to perceive with certainty the strategies of opponents (other agents) owing to the dynamic changes entailed by the neighborhood of opponents. In such uncertain scenarios, agents will try to update their strategy based on their own rules or their intrinsic behavior. We study risk seeking, risk averse and risk neutral behaviors of such agents via certain game theory notions. We found that risk averse agents tend to achieve faster evacuation time whenever the time delay in conflicts appears to be longer. The results of our simulations also comply with previous work and conform to the fact that evacuation time of agents becomes shorter once mutual cooperation among agents is achieved. Although the impatient strategy appears to be the rational strategy that might lead to faster evacuation times, our study scientifically shows that the more the agents are impatient, the slower is the egress time.