Abstract
The post-war US global base system was established through bilateral agreements with states where the boundaries between domestic legislation and extra-territoriality were frequently blurred. With references to theories of sovereignty, the article discusses the enforcement of the US-Icelandic defence agreement from 1951 to the present. The focus is on the tension between state sovereignty, involving an unarmed state, and the foreign base rights of a world power. It is shown that during the Cold War, the United States interpreted its military rights broadly, claiming to have the right to interfere in Icelandic internal affairs to thwart a communist coup and to transfer nuclear weapons to Iceland. Conversely, Iceland sought to control the scope of the US presence by putting a limit on the number of troops and lessen its societal impact by curtailing fraternization between US troops and Icelandic civilians. After the Cold War, Iceland’s efforts to keep the base proved unsuccessful, when the United Stated decided to close it down. Yet, since the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, the United States has re-established a rotational military presence in Iceland through the defence agreement, regaining many of the jurisdictional territorial rights, it gave up with the base closing.
Published Version
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