Abstract
This chapter discusses a discrete model of two-sided matching. Such models show power to organize and explain certain empirical regularities observed in some kinds of labor markets, particularly entry level labor markets. The chapter describes the history and operation of the labor market for medical interns and residents. A set of stable outcomes are defined, closely related to the core of the market, and this kind of stability is an appropriate solution concept for this kind of market. The chapter presents the theoretical results most closely related to the various market phenomena and discusses some related phenomena in similar markets in the United Kingdom. It also provides further theoretical results concerning the structure of the set of stable outcomes. It is possible to extend the empirical investigation of the predictions of the kind of theory to two-sided matching markets that are operated in a completely decentralized manner.
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