Abstract
A great deal of progress has been made recently in the study of two-sided matching processes, modelled both as cooperative games and as strategic games with complete information. Here we consider a natural model of incomplete information, in which agents know their own preferences but may not know those of others. It is shown that results concerning dominant and dominated strategies carry over from the complete information case to the present model, but results concerning Nash equilibria do not. Some of the modelling implications of this are briefly considered.
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