Two or three levels of contention? Applying explanations of presidential instability in Latin America to the 2010s cases

Abstract

The paper reviews explanations about presidential term interruptions in Latin America and applies them to the 2010s cases, which are: Fernando Lugo (Paraguay, 2012); Otto Pérez Molina (Guatemala, 2015); Dilma Rousseff (Brazil, 2016); Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (Peru, 2018); and Evo Morales (Bolivia, 2019). The study sample also includes Legislative decisions to discontinue processes against presidents of Guatemala (2017), Brazil (2017, twice), and Paraguay (2019). The QCA results give support for proposing an alternative to Pérez-Liñán’s (2014) two-level theory and adding a third level of contention related to military intervention, an old-fashioned variable that was decisive in the Evo Morales’ case. Besides having shields in the Legislative and on the streets, Latin American presidents need a shield provided by militarized security forces to protect them from term interruptions, since these corps have gained influence in the democratic politics of the region. Contrary to literature expectations, the presidential exits of the 2010s have not been enough to disperse political tension.