Abstract

A review of two decades of the India-Pakistan nuclear relationship shows that, like all nuclear rivalries, deterrence works at a minimal level regardless of beliefs about the requirements of deterrence. Also, like other nuclear rivalries, it displays a fundamentally schizophrenic behaviour pattern. When conflict draws close, India and Pakistan completely reject the usability of nuclear weapons and ignore the tenets of deterrence theory and doctrine; but when conflict is distant, they tend to behave as if the weapons are usable, which influences their doctrines and weapons acquisitions. The India-Pakistan case reveals a relatively cost-effective and risk-resistant minimalism, but is distorted by powerful elements of thinking—typified by the writings of Albert Wohlstetter—that has produced an arms race and a significant element of instability into the relationship

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