Two conceptions of compatibilism in the Critical Elucidation

Abstract

The 'Critical Elucidation of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason' develops two distinctive conceptions of how freedom of choice and causal determinism may be reconciled. These two conceptions of freedom of choice correspond to a distinction between what Kant calls 'psychological' and what he calls 'transcendental freedom'. The Critical Elucidation presents the argument of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason as a kind of practical syllogism that highlights the distinctive contribution of pure practical reason and the complementary relation of the standpoints belonging to theoretical and pure practical reason. The pure practical concepts of morality involve principles of action that are independent of causal antecedents because they are based on the general principle of autonomy. Kant's fusion of incompatibilism and compatibilism needs to explain how one and the same action can be both caused by antecedent events and nevertheless be an action for which one can be held responsible.