The Problem

Abstract

Abstract This chapter traces Kant’s shift from an incompatibilist to a compatibilist conception of human freedom: in the 1750s Kant considers that human freedom does not require the agent to be able to do otherwise, nor does Kant require the agent to be ultimately responsible for his or her actions. Over the course of the 1760s and 1770s, Kant changes his mind on both points, requiring for significant human freedom both that we can do otherwise than we do, and that we are ultimately responsible for our actions. The freedom that satisfies both conditions is what Kant calls ‘transcendental freedom’. Kant’s shifting position is located with reference to Leibniz, Crusius, and Rousseau. The chapter draws upon Kant’s reflections on Rousseau in the early 1760s, his Only Possible Argument, related Reflexionen from the mid-1760s, and ‘Lectures on Metaphysics’ from the 1770s. The chapter engages in particular with Pereboom, Ameriks, and Kain.