Turkish Strategic Participation

Abstract

This paper argues that Turkey’s current hard power participation in its region can be understood as “Strategic Participation.” It posits this approach is a shift in strategy, not goals from the “zero problems with neighbours” policy piloted by former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. It applies this argument to the case of increasing Russian regional intervention, and argues that Turkey’s response to Russia is in line with the goal of Davutoğlu’s Strategic Depth doctrine of leveraging historical identity and diversifying strategic relationships. It combines the “principal-agent” and “concordance” civil–military relations theories of Feaver and Schiff to clarify the AKP’s role in foreign policy and employ’s Walt’s “balance-of-threat” theory to assess the Russian threat. It argues that civil–military relations after the Ergenekon and Bayloz trials enabled Strategic Depth to become established in the AKP, and that Turkish concerns over NATO commitment have created a security deficit that exacerbates the asymmetric Russian threat. It then surveys Turkish relations with four states — Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, and Iraq — along three indicators: shared threat; military co-operation; and economic dependence. It concludes that Turkey is working to bolster co-operation with key regional states to compensate for the perceived “security deficit” in the face of asymmetric threat from Russia, in line with the strategic diversification objectives required under Strategic Participation.