Truthmaker Theory and Naturalism

Abstract

AbstractThis paper argues that there is a heretofore unresolved tension between truthmaker-style metaphysics and a plausible version of Naturalism. At the turn of the century, George Molnar proposed fourprima facieplausible principles for a realist metaphysics in order to expose truthmaker theory’s incapacity to find truthmakers for negative truths. I marshal the current plethora of attempted solutions to the problem into a crisp trilemma. Those whosolveit claim that Molnar’s tetrad is consistent; those whodissolveit do away with the requirement that every truth needs a truthmaker; and those whoabsolveit embrace a negative ontology. I argue that one is forced to absolve the problem: all other avenues undermine the truthmaker principle itself. Absolving the problem, however, does not sit well with a version of Naturalism that most would accept. We are drawn to a simple dilemma:eitherembrace a negative ontology,orreject truthmaker-style metaphysics.