Abstract

A central problem for any truthmaker theory is the problem of negative truths(P-NEG). In this paper, I develop a novel, piecemeal strategy for solving this problem. The strategy puts central focus on a truth-relevant notion of aboutness within a metaphysically modest version of truthmaker theory and uses key conceptual tools gained by taking a deeper look at the best attempts to solve the problem of intentionality. I begin this task by critically discussing past proposed solutions to P-NEG in light of Russell’s debate with Demos. This reveals a central difficulty with addressing the problem, specifically that one cannot be committed to incompatibility facts in one’s account of negation and of the truth of negative truths. I then present an aboutness-based version of truthmaker theory. Utilising what I call the strict and full account of aboutness, I extract aboutness-based theories of truth and falsity. I use this machinery to present a promising new strategy for solving P-NEG which does not have the problems of alternative approaches. Finally, I present and respond to some potential objections.

Highlights

  • I use the aboutness-machinery of a modest version of truthmaker theory to sketch a novel, piecemeal strategy for solving the central problem for any truthmaker theory, namely the problem of negative truths (P- NEG)

  • I focus my attention on key aspects of what I call the strict and full account of aboutness and of the theory of intentionality which help us address the problem of intentionality

  • Truthmaker Maximalism (Maximalism or T- M),3 which states that all truths require truthmakers to make them true, or accept “unsavoury” negative facts, such as Pegasus’s non-existence or the cat’s not being on the mat, into one’s ontology

Read more

Summary

Introduction

I use the aboutness-machinery of a modest version of truthmaker theory to sketch a novel, piecemeal strategy for solving the central problem for any truthmaker theory, namely the problem of negative truths (P- NEG). I focus my attention on key aspects of what I call the strict and full account of aboutness and of the theory of intentionality which help us address the problem of intentionality. This allows me to extract aboutness-based theories of truth and falsity.

The problem of negative truths and some difficulties for addressing it
Cameron and Parsons’s strategy for addressing Molnar
The real distinction between negatives and positives
The aboutness-based version of truthmaker theory
What the best semantic account says truthbearers are about
SAC and derivative aboutness
Strictness
SAC and the problem of intentionality
The SAC-ist solution to the problem of negative truths
Responses to potential objections
The strategy lets us conserve classical logic
Is the strategy Meinongian?
Conclusion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call