Abstract

Could it be right to convict and punish defendants using only statistical evidence? In this paper, I argue that it is not and explain why it would be wrong. This is difficult to do because there is a powerful argument for thinking that we should convict and punish defendants using statistical evidence. It looks as if the relevant cases are cases of decision under risk and it seems we know what we should do in such cases (i.e., maximize expected value). Given some standard assumptions about the values at stake, the case for convicting and punishing using statistical evidence seems solid. In trying to show where this argument goes wrong, I shall argue (against Lockeans, reliabilists, and others) that beliefs supported only by statistical evidence are epistemically defective and (against Enoch, Fisher, and Spectre) that these epistemic considerations should matter to the law. To solve the puzzle about the role of statistical evidence in the law, we need to revise some commonly held assumptions about epistemic value and defend the relevance of epistemology to this practical question.

Highlights

  • Let’s consider an example: Prisoners100 prisoners are exercising in the prison yard

  • Could it be right to convict and punish defendants using only statistical evidence? In this paper, I argue that it is not and explain why it would be wrong. This is difficult to do because there is a powerful argument for thinking that we should convict and punish defendants using statistical evidence

  • While I think the following thesis is counterintuitive, there are powerful arguments for it: Punish: It is permissible to punish the defendant in Prisoners

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Summary

Introduction

100 prisoners are exercising in the prison yard. Suddenly 99 of them attack the guard, putting into action a plan that the 100th prisoner knew nothing about. There is a related epistemological thesis that I think we should consider alongside Punish: Believe: It is permissible to believe that the defendant is guilty in Prisoners (and similar cases where the only evidence of guilt is statistical evidence).. If it would be unreasonable to take some defendant to be involved in some criminal act, for example, this has a bearing on the justification of punishment in a way that, say, the justification of taking an umbrella doesn’t turn on whether we would be justified in fully believing that it will rain or sleet As it happens, I think a case can be made for thinking that the justification of (full) beliefs concerning a defendant’s guilt require more than grounds that would warrant a high degree of confidence in the defendant’s guilt.

An argument for punish
Tribe and reasonable doubt
The criminal class
Thomson’s guarantee
An argument for believe
Moral considerations
Never the innocent
Capped convictions
Reasonable conviction
Believe?
Veritism and the Lockean view
Defeatism
Gnosticism
Findings
Is gnosticism necessary?
Full Text
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