Abstract

Nowadays it is not uncommon to find claims to the effect that the notion of truth is ultimately an epistemic notion. Truth is accordingly said to depend on one’s viewpoint and background knowledge (or something like that). I think that this is basically a correct idea. However, there remains much to be done in clarifying what exactly is involved in the claimed epistemic nature of truth. I have recently investigated this matter in the context of developing and defending a version of epistemic (or ‘internal’) scientific realism (see Tuomela, 1984). What I shall try to do below is somewhat different. For I will take it for granted that truth indeed is epistemic and then go on to investigate the relation between truth and (best) explanation. It will not be my aim to claim that somehow (epistemic) truth and best explanation are identical notions. But I do defend the claim that it is reasonable to think that true theories and best-explaining theories coincide.

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