Truman's revenge : Social control and corporate crime

Abstract

Many criminologists have found that corporate crime does more harm than street crime, whether measured by property lost, money stolen, or lives taken. Yet, public concern about crime is almost exclusively focused on street crime and “just deserts” for the offender. The authors argue that corporate criminality is more likely than individual criminality to be planned and subjected to cost/benefit analysis than street crime and therefore more likely to be deterred by raising the costs of corporate criminality. The Model Penal Code is used to demonstrate that both individual and corporate crime produce a comparable array of avoidable harms. Public policies that demand just deserts for individual offenders (natural persons) are revealed as highly inconsistent with policies that protect corporations (juristic persons) from accountability for the harms they create. A philosophical and legal foundation for corporate crime control strategies is provided. The authors propose a sanctions regime for corporate criminals comparable to the sanctions regime imposed on natural persons for street crimes. Strategies to avoid risk shifting by corporations are suggested.