Abstract


 The different models for the criminal liability of juristic persons reveal a tension between individualist and realistic approaches. For individualists a corporation is the product of a union of individuals. This means that a juristic person can only be held criminally responsible if the conduct and fault of an individual involved in the entity are attributed to the juristic person. For realists a corporate entity has an existence independent of its individual members. The juristic person is blameworthy because its corporate identity or corporate ethos encouraged the criminal conduct. A study of organisational theory reveals that corporate crime may not necessarily be traced to the fault of specific individuals. Corporate criminality often is the result of complex decisions on different levels of the corporate hierarchy and furthermore is encouraged by the manner in which the organisation is structured. Prominent scholars such as the American philosopher Peter A French and the Australian Brent Fisse rejected an individualist approach and attempted to develop models of corporate fault based on the corporate identity idea. The failure of a corporation to take preventative or corrective measures in reaction to corporate criminal conduct is regarded as the basis for corporate fault by these authors. French calls this the "principle of responsive adjustment" whilst Fisse names it the concept of "reactive fault." A more sophisticated model (the "corporate ethos" model), which is also more reconcilable with the basic notions of criminal law, was developed by the American legal scholar Pamela Bucy.
 
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 A corporation will be held criminally responsible if its corporate ethos has encouraged the criminal conduct. The corporate ethos can be established with reference to numerous factors such as the corporate hierarchy, corporate goals, the existing monitoring and compliance systems and the question whether employees are rewarded or indemnified for inappropriate behavior.
 
 
 
 
 
 

Highlights

  • KORPORATIEWE IDENTITEIT AS GRONDSLAG VAN DIE STRAFREGTELIKE AANSPREEKLIKHEID VAN REGSPERSONE (1): TEORETIESE GRONDBEGINSELS Pieter du Toit* Gerrit Pienaar**

  • Wanneer teorieë wat verband hou met die aard van organisasies in ag geneem word, word dit duidelik dat dit feitlik onmoontlik is om korporatiewe gedrag uitsluitlik met die skuld van individue verbonde aan die organisasie in verband te bring

  • In Australië is die sosioloog John Braithwaite en die regsgeleerde Brent Fisse verantwoordelik vir die skepping van die teorie dat die skuld van regspersone, juis vanweë hul besondere identiteit, nie net af te lei is van hul gedrag voor en tydens die pleeg van die wederregtelike daad nie, maar ook in die versuim om korrektief op tree nadat die misdaad reeds gepleeg is.[21]

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Summary

Inleiding

Die verskillende benaderings tot die strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid van regspersone lê die spanningsveld tussen die individualisme of nominalisme aan die een kant en die realisme, aan die ander kant bloot.[1]. Volgens die individualistiese teorieë moet die gedrag en skuld van individue dus op die een of ander wyse aan die regspersoon oorgedra word alvorens dit strafregtelik aanspreeklik gestel kan word.[2] Vir die realiste is die bestaansreg van regspersone onafhanklik van hul samestellende individue en word dit beklee met ’n unieke (en vir sommige realiste, ’n morele) persoonlikheid.[3] Foerschler[4] skryf byvoorbeeld dat die reg die korporatiewe struktuur moet beskou as "an intentional agent in and of itself." Die idee dat regspersone direk strafregtelik aanspreeklik gestel word op grond van hul besondere identiteit of die heersende kultuur van die regspersoon is ’n ontwikkeling wat veral in die Amerikaanse regsliteratuur op die voorgrond geplaas is. In ’n opvolgende bydrae sal aandag gegee word aan die wyses waarop hierdie benadering reeds in die praktyk beslag gekry het

Organisasieteorie en die reg
Inleidend
Regspersone as morele rolspelers
Die CID-struktuur
Die PRA-beginsel
Kritiek op French se teorie
Die aard van regspersone
Terugwerkende skuld
Kritiek op die benadering van Fisse en Braithwaite
Die aard van die korporatiewe etos-teorie
Die vasstelling van die korporatiewe etos
Kommentaar op Bucy se teorie
Gevolgtrekking
Full Text
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