Abstract
Low-carbon technology innovation of power grid is vital for grid enterprises to improve their competitiveness and resource utilization efficiency. In this paper, a novel tripartite evolutionary game theory is proposed to examine the behavioral strategies of government, banks, and the grid enterprises in the low-carbon power grid technology innovation cooperation. The evolutionary replication dynamics equations are presented to study evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of participants. The meaningful simulation results are as follows: from the subsidy perspective, even if the government subsidies are phasing out, the ESS of the low-carbon grid technology cooperation still converges to the Pareto optimal equilibrium; from the cost perspective, the higher low-carbon technology innovation cost only slows down the evolution rate, while the higher business cost of carbon asset pledge credit and the lower incentive cost not only slow down the evolution rate but also change the evolution results. It shows that the business cost of carbon asset pledge credit has a greater impact on the evolution of the system than the incentive cost; from the benefit perspective, increasing the green revenue and the successful probability of the low-carbon technology innovation can both prompt the ESS to evolve to Pareto optimal state, and the effect of the former is greater than the latter. These results provide a theoretical guidance for government to promote the development of low-carbon technology innovation of power grid.
Highlights
Facing the challenges of global climate safety and domestic environmental pressure, China has established seven emission trading markets since 2011, including Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangdong, Shenzhen, Hebei and Chongqing [1]
This paper establishes a tripartite dynamic evolutionary game model to study the evolutionary process of the low-carbon power grid technology cooperation among the grid enterprises, the banks and the government
Three key parameters as decision variables, i.e., the low-carbon technology innovation cost, the extra technology innovation financial cost and the successful probability of the low-carbon technology innovation are introduced into the model
Summary
Facing the challenges of global climate safety and domestic environmental pressure, China has established seven emission trading markets since 2011, including Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangdong, Shenzhen, Hebei and Chongqing [1]. The aim of this paper is to establish an evolutionary game model for the low-carbon power grid technology cooperation problem among the heterogeneous entities. We introduce three kinds of costs into the game model according to the characteristics of heterogeneous entities These costs include the grid enterprises’ low-carbon technology innovation cost, the banks’ business cost of carbon asset pledge credit and the government’s incentive cost. We present simulation to compare the results of the evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) to provide reference for the grid enterprises, banks and government in the low-carbon power grid technology cooperation. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION In this paper, the financing of low-carbon grid technology innovation involves three heterogeneous entities, i.e., grid enterprises, banks and government. Since the carbon asset pledge credit is presented for the low-carbon technology innovation of the grid enterprises, the banks have the potential benefits E2. The average earning of the government is denoted by U 3 showed as follows:
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