Tripartite Coordinated Regulation of New Energy Vehicles Based on Dynamic Bayesian Game

Changyu Liu,Le Chang,Guanglong Dong,Yadong Song

doi:10.3389/fenvs.2021.649008

Abstract

Manufacturers are disseminating false or ambiguous information regarding new energy vehicles (NEVs), which has led to skepticism from consumers about the quality of NEVs. In this research, we simultaneously considered the relationship among manufacturers, consumers, and governments from the perspective of stakeholders, and then we analyzed the tripartite coordinated regulation. In view of the serious information asymmetry of NEVs, we innovatively developed the Bayesian dynamic game model. By solving refined Bayesian equilibrium strategies, this study explores the effects of key influencing factors on strategic choices. On the basis of the conclusion, relevant countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to engender effective regulation by governments.

Highlights

Environmental deterioration issues such as high emission levels and global warming have become a global focus during the past decades
The motivations of our research for solving the above problems are the following: (1) This paper proposes a Bayesian game model, which differs from the previous perfect information game, to analyze the decisions of government regulation, consumers’ consumption, and manufacturer production in asymmetric information
In the incomplete information dynamic game, the Bayesian game model is used to describe and explain the game mechanism chosen by participants in new energy vehicles (NEVs)

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Environmental deterioration issues such as high emission levels and global warming have become a global focus during the past decades. Excluding manufacturers and governments and adding consumers as stakeholders in the game can help further explore the regulation of NEVs. tripartite coordinated regulation of NEVs represents more realistic situations, and the interaction relationship among the three participants can be analyzed. 2. With the asymmetric information, how can the tripartite game model among governments, manufacturers, and consumers in NEVs be formulated?. The motivations of our research for solving the above problems are the following: (1) This paper proposes a Bayesian game model, which differs from the previous perfect information game, to analyze the decisions of government regulation, consumers’ consumption, and manufacturer production in asymmetric information. (2) Discuss the tripartite coordinated regulation on the quality of NEVs to investigate the decisions of different participants and obtain the optimal strategy.

LITERATURE REVIEW

CONCLUSION