Transnational Cyber Governance for Risk Management in the Gas Sector: Exploring the Potential of G7 Cooperation

Abstract

At the Group of Seven (G7) summit held on 13–15 June in 2024, the Group’s leaders committed to establishing a collective cyber security framework and reinforcing the work of the cyber security working group to manage the risks targeting energy systems. Likewise, oil and electricity, and natural gas rely on complex and interdependent technologies and communication networks from production to consumption. The preparedness to handle cyber security threats in the energy infrastructures among decision makers, planners, and the industry in a concerted manner signifies that cyber security is becoming more appreciated. Therefore, considering the ambition and achievement of the G7 countries towards energy and cyber sovereignty, this paper’s focus and research question aims to explore the potential existence of the cyber governance alliance in the gas subsector within the G7. The objective of this paper is twofold. First, it explores the potential of the G7, the world’s seven largest advanced economies, to lead on a nascent cyber governance for risk management in the gas sector. The qualitative analysis conducted through the institutional analysis and design method examines up-to-date data involving mainly state actors. Second, by drawing on LNG, one of the world’s fastest growing energy types in the coming decades, the paper points out the need for further research on the transnational governance operating through public–private engagement to address the cyber risks to gas systems. While the paper makes an empirical contribution to the field of security governance and a practical contribution to security consulting, its limitations rely on the necessity to also conduct a quantitative enquiry, which would necessitate, among others, a review of the literature in the G7 countries, and a group of researchers from academia and practitioners to obtain a sense of the cyberspace in the energy reality.