Transmission Network Investment Using Incentive Regulation: A Disjunctive Programming Approach

Abstract

A well-planned electric transmission infrastructure is the foundation of a reliable and efficient power system, especially in the presence of large scale renewable generation. However, the current electricity market designs lack incentive mechanisms which can guarantee optimal transmission investments and ensure reliable integration of renewable generation such as wind. This paper first proposes a stochastic bilevel disjunctive program for optimal transmission investment based on the newly proposed theoretical H-R-G-V incentive mechanism. The upper level is a profit-maximization problem of an independent transmission company (Transco), while the lower level is a welfare maximization problem. The revenue of the Transco is bounded by a regulatory constraint set by the regulator in order to induce socially optimal investments. The application of the H-R-G-V mechanism allows the regulator to ensure social maximum transmission investments and helps to reduce transmission congestion and wind power spillage. The transmission investment under the H-R-G-V mechanism is modeled as a stochastic bilevel disjunctive program. To solve the developed mathematical model we first propose a series of linearization and reformulation techniques to recast the original model as a stochastic mixed integer linear problem (MILP). We exploit the disjunctive nature of the reformulated stochastic MILP model and further propose a Bean decomposition algorithm to efficiently solve the stochastic MILP model. The proposed decomposition algorithm is also modified and accelerated to improve the computational performance. The computational performance of our MILP modeling approach and modified and accelerated Bean decomposition algorithm is studied through several examples in detail. The simulation results confirm a promising performance of both the modeling approach and its solution algorithm.