Abstract
To distribute the right-of-way of intersection reasonably, the game model between each adjacent agent was obtained through agent technology. The Nash equilibrium model to measure the negotiation effects was proposed, and the existence of the Nash equilibrium solution was proved. We obtained the game equilibrium solution between each adjacent agent and thus got the equilibrium price (cost) in the network. According to the equilibrium price, travelers will choose the best path in transportation networks by adopting the path strategy with the minimum cost or fuzzy-comparison strategy. The results indicate that the contract mode algorithm makes signal control of each intersection coordinated and unified and shows subjective initiative of traffic control and management fully. The contract-based algorithm combining the management initiatives with the driver’s rational behavior will make the control effectiveness of the road network system increase by 55.58%. Hence, it is an effective measurement for studying coordination between system optimality and user optimality.
Highlights
Introduction e target of an IntelligentTransportation System is to configure the actual traffic demand rationally in time and space by a certain control means and the induction strategies, so that the distribution equilibrium of traffic flow can be reached in the road network, and the overall resources and the traffic capacity of the road network can be fully utilized. e effectively induced information should consider the traveler’s response to the information and choice preferences, which can estimate the expected benefits of both the traveler and transport system
Dong et al [1] applied a two-person static game model in multi-intersection coordinate control problem. They proposed some concepts of game theory such as pure strategy Nash equilibrium, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, Pareto efficiency solution, and Pareto improvement solution of Nash equilibrium for solving traffic control at multi-intersection coordination
Qi [2] establishes the congestion model of intersection between drivers and traffic administration based on the benefit-tending characteristics of the drivers and traffic administrations, an incorrect inducement for traffic administration to take the strategy that prevents vehicles from crossing the intersection during the amber light, where each intersection is regarded as a noncooperative game
Summary
Where V is the set of intersections in the traffic network and E is the set of directed roads between two adjacent intersections. If any two adjacent agents in the network are individually rational and follow the validity, the following hold: 1 the negotiation between them can reach an agreement; 2 the final agreement price reaches Nash equilibrium; that is, pkij∗. U∗j U∗ij > Uij Uj, i∈Vj i∈Vj that is, U∗j > Uj. where k ∈ Sji and i ∈ Vj. According to the validity, the bid prices of all agents in Vj and agent j will be selected in the Pareto set, and the final agreement price between j and his adjacent agents must be the Nash equilibrium price:. Every two adjacent agents select their quotation price in the Pareto set, and the final agreement price must be Nash equilibrium solution in the road network. Where λ0 is the minimum green time to make sure vehicles and pedestrians get through the intersection safely and λ1 is the maximum green time of signal phase for intersection j
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