Abstract
Auctions are the most widely used strategic game-theoretic mechanisms in the Internet. Auctions have been mostly studied from a game-theoretic and economic perspective, although recent work in AI and OR has been concerned with computational aspects of auctions as well. When faced from a computational perspective, combinatorial auctions are perhaps the most challenging type of auctions. Combinatorial auctions are auctions where agents may submit bids for bundles of goods. Given that finding an optimal allocation of the goods in a combinatorial auction is in general intractable, researchers have been concerned with exposing tractable instances of combinatorial auctions. In this work we expose the use of b-matching techniques in the context of combinatorial auctions, and apply them in a non-trivial manner in order to introduce polynomial solutions for a variety of combinatorial auctions.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
