On Multi-Object Auctions and Matching Theory: Algorithmic Aspects

Abstract

Auctions are the most widely used strategic game-theoretic mechanisms in the Internet. Auctions have been mostly studied from a game-theoretic and economic perspective, although recent work in AI and OR has been concerned with computational aspects of auctions as well. When faced from a computational perspective, combinatorial auctions are perhaps the most challenging type of auctions. Combinatorial auctions are auctions where buyers may submit bids for bundles of goods. Another interesting direction is that of constrained auctions where some restrictions are imposed upon the set of feasible solutions. Given that finding an optimal allocation of the goods in a combinatorial and/or constrained auction is in general intractable, researchers have been concerned with exposing tractable instances of combinatorial and constrained auctions problems. In this chapter we discuss the use of b-matching techniques in the context of combinatorial and constrained auctions.