Towards the intellectual compatibilism

Abstract

In present thesis, the author deals with the problem of free will and the possibility of its existence. He discovers the falsity of libertarianism radically conceived, according to which (radical) indeterminism is required for free will. But if we show that radical indeterminism is false, and if we deny any type of compatibilism as well, a logical dilemma once called an "Ancient Dilemma" enters the scene: If neither determinism nor indeterminism is consistent with free will, then free will simply cannot exist. The author provides a solution for this dilemma, while attempting to prove human freedom consistent. As he believes, however, this cannot be done until some important distinctions are provided, especially between External and Internal Determinism. While the author refutes External Determinism (and External Compatibilism), he defends Internal (or Intellectual) Determinism (as well as respective compatibilism). In the ending passage of his treatment, the author compares his philosophical solution of the free will problem with some recent scientific theories, especially with the physicalistically concieved Law of Conservation of Energy.